Abstract-We consider a cellular system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. They are sharing a set of communication channels. Each Femtocell has multiple users requiring certain minimum rate guarantees. Each channel has a peak power constraint to limit interference to the Macro Base Station (BS). We formulate the problem of channel allocation and power control at the Femtocells as a noncooperative Game. We develop decentralized algorithms to obtain a Coarse Correlated equilibrium that satisfies the QoS of each user. If the QoS of all the users cannot be satisfied, then we obtain a fair equilibrium.
can also sense the SINR in each subchannel and can further be directed by the MBS on the maximum power they can use in transmitting in different available subchannels. This information can be sent to the FBS by the MSs within its domain or by the MBS directly (see e.g., [37] ). FBS uses this information to decide on subchannel allocation and power control within its FC to provide QoS to its users while using minimum power within the limits prescribed by the Let the interference from MC for user j in FC k on channel i be I k i,j . We assume that the receiver noise variance σ 2 is same for all FCs and channels (although this can also be different and our setup will require no change for this). Let G 
such that 
where C k i,j = log 2 1 +
is the transmission rate for user j on channel i in FC k if channel j is allocated to it and Γ is the SNR gap included for practical rates achievable depending on the modulation and coding scheme ( [6] ).
Equation (2) specifies the minimum rate requirements, while (3) specifies the power constraints on each channel. The constraint (4) ensures that any subchannel is allocated to only one user within a FC. Also, while trying to provide QoS to each of its users, each FC also wants to minimize the total power (1) it needs, to reduce the costs involved as well as to address the green communication related issues ( [14] ). Since the decisions made by each FC affect the decisions of other FCs, we address this problem as a game.
III. GAME THEORETIC SOLUTION

A. Game formulation and solution
We formulate the game for our system as G = I , X , (Φ k (x)) k∈I , where I = {1, 2, ..., K}, the set of FCs is the set of players, X is the overall strategy space and
We define strategy set X = {(
We are interested in finding a decentralized energy efficient Nash Equilibrium ( [30] ) which provides QoS to each user in the system (if at all possible). If it is not possible we provide a fair NE (to be defined later).
Define the utility function for FC k by
Maximizing Φ k (x) will minimize the total power used by FC k. It is easy to verify that the game G defined above is an exact Potential game ( [23] ) with Potential function
We observe that X is a compact set. Also the potential function f is continuous. Therefore, it has a global maximizer and hence has a (generalized) NE ( [12] , [30] ). In the following we provide distributed algorithms to compute a NE.
Let
where X k (x −k ) is the set of strategies of k which are possible when the strategies of all other users are
provides strategies for player k which maximize its utility for a fixed strategy x −k by all other users. For a given x −k , best response provides an element of D k (x −k ).
Let for an > 0 and x −k ,
Then -Better Response provides a point in
For a potential game better response and -better response based iterated algorithms usually converge. However, for our problem the feasible strategy set of a player, due to (2) is dependent on the strategies being played by the other players.
Therefore, for the resulting (generalized) NE the best response dynamics may not converge [9] .
The -Better Response algorithm obtains, at iteration n + 1,
and then passes on the -better response to FC k + 1.
Since the potential function is bounded and in the -better response algorithm, the potential function increases by atleast
, it converges in a finite number of steps to an -Nash Point ( [24] ).
For computationally simple algorithms, we consider random-better response (or random -better response) which converges for the above potential game. These algorithms have lower complexity per iteration. But for a continuous strategy space one may need a large number of iterations. Thus, we have developed a novel variation of these algorithms in [29] which converges much faster. This algorithm assumes that there are enough resources available in the system so that the QoS of each user in each FC can be satisfied.
If the QoS of all the users in all the FCs cannot be satisfied then we have developed a distributed algorithm in [29] to obtain a "fair" NE. In this case, we try to satisfy the largest fraction of QoS of all the users in each FC. In particular, for each FC k we obtain power P k and subchannel allocation A k that max α k (10) such that
For this problem, since X k is compact and utility functions α k are continuous, the game has a (mixed) NE (MNE) [10] .
However, it is not a Potential game. In [29] we discretized the powers and provided a regret matching algorithm based on [13] which converges to a correlated equilibrium (CE) of the discretized game. It can be shown that as the discretization step goes to zero, the CE of the discretized game converges to that of the original game( [32] , [33] ).
When the QoS of all the users cannot be satisfied in each FC, then α k of the solution is < 1 at least for some k. If it can be satisfied, then we may see that at the solution point (4), (10)- (11) we present another algorithm, based on multiplicative weights algorithm [27] . This algorithm has less computational complexity than the regret matching algorithm but converges to the set of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) instead of, to the set of correlated equilibria (CE).
strategies is a CCE [27] if for every player k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} and for every unilateral deviation
where x ∼ σ denotes that the overall strategy x has distribution σ and on the right hand side x −k has the marginal distribution from σ.
Since MNE ⊆ CE ⊆ CCE, CCE also exists for our problem.
Furthermore, the price of anarchy of CCE is shown to be no worse than that of a pure NE for a reasonably large class of games ( [28] ).
To obtain a CCE for our problem, we again discretize the powers to obtain a finite game. For this finite game, the algorithm to obtain a CCE is provided in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, we first use the multiplicative weights algorithm (Algorithm 2) to obtain a CCE. If α k < 1 for some k then we retain that solution. But we reduce (via KKT) the power allocation of the users which are getting more rate than their requirements, so that the overall powers are reduced and α k of those users becomes 1. This will not reduce α k of others users. But it can possibly increase α k of users with α k < 1 because their interference is reduced. If α k ≥ 1 for all k, then we retain the channel allocation of all the FCs but play a power game among the users to minimize the total sum powers while making α k = 1 for each k.
for all (i, j) and play power allocation game. (1), (2), (3) Therefore, instead of taking α k as the utility to maximize, Another way to address our problem is via penalty function approach. For ρ > 0, consider the cost function
For this game also, the strategy space
continuous. Hence the game has (mixed) NE [10] .
To apply Algorithm 1, we consider the normalised cost
We will call this Algorithm 2A.
For this problem formulation, we do not need to play a power game after the CCE is obtained because when α k ≥ 1 for all k, due to the cost function chosen, for reasonable values of ρ, the rates obtained for the different users will not be substantially more thanR k i . Thus we can use Algorithm 2 only. However, the CCE for (10) will generally be fair (within a FC) when the QoS are not satisfied while for the present formulation it may be less likely.
We will compare the solutions obtained by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2A in section VII.
IV. PARETO OPTIMAL POINTS
The CCE obtained from the above algorithms (Algorithms 
A global optimal point of Φ is a Pareto point [22] .
Now we take Φ k = min(1, α k ), where α k has been defined as before. The reason for choosing min(1, α k ) instead of α k is that taking α k will allow the possibility of the Pareto point to maximize the sum of the α's while some α k may be strictly less than 1, even when it was possible to satisfy the QoS of all the users. This will not happen with the modified utility function.
Since the strategy space X = K k=1 X k is compact and each Φ k for our problem is continuous, Φ has a global maximum and hence a Pareto point. The same can be said about the cost function (
As in case of CCE, if we have enough resources to satisfy the QoS of all the users in each FC, then we will get α k = 1 for all the FCs. Now the rates received by some of the users may be more than needed and hence the powers used by an FC may be more than needed. Thus, now as per the CCE case we keep the channel allocations fixed and play the power game to reduce the powers needed by each FC. Being a potential game, it also provides a Pareto point.
Instead of using (10), we can also use (12) to get Pareto points. Now, as said for CCE, we will not need to play a power game later on. Thus, the complexity to obtain the Pareto point is less. However, we expect that Pareto point obtained via (10) fairer solution within a FC (higher α k ). We will see this in example provided in the section VII.
To obtain a global optimal of (14) in our distributed setup we use the following algorithm. We descretize the power levels. Then the overall strategy space becomes a finite set.
We use Algorithm 3 below to get its global optimal. If each Φ k is continuous and the strategy space is compact, then we can easily show that for each > 0 there is a discretization of state space for which the global optimal is within of the global optimal of Φ.
In Algorithm 3, each user updates its strategy as follows. It picks randomly, uniformly one of its channels and changes its allocation randomly, to one of the other users. Power allocation to all the channels are randomly, uniformly picked from the discrete set. If at these new strategies of all the FCs, Φ(x)
increases, then the users update to the new strategy; otherwise they retain the previous one.
We can modify Algorithm 3 by changing the first step to change the allocation of all the channels (instead of only one of the channels), uniformly to the users. We call this Algorithm 3M.
Proposition 1 below shows that Algorithm 3M converges to a Pareto point with probability 1. However, Algorithm 3, which is a heuristic (e.g., does not guarantee convergence to a Pareto point) often obtains the Pareto point much faster than Algorithm 3M. We will show this in section VII via examples. The reason for this is that Algorithm 3 does local stochastic search instead of global stochastic search. Global search ensures convergence but since it searches over a much larger space, it can be very slow in finding better strategies.
However, the local search can get struck into local optima. But in our setup, this local search is not so local (due to multiple users and FCs) and hence chances of our obtaining a global optimum are high. Indeed in most of the cases we considered we obtained the global optimum.
Proposition 1. The number of steps needed by Algorithm 3M
to reach a Pareto optimal point x * with probability ≥ 1 − is
where ∈ (0, 1] and M = |X |, the cardinality of X . Also,
where R is the number of steps to reach x * .
Proof. Let x ∈ X be picked with uniform distribution. Then,
Hence,
given ∈ (0, 1], probability of hitting x * in n steps is
. From (15), R has a finite exponential moment.
In this algorithm (3 or 3M), the random updates of all the users are taken into account together and Φ is computed by each user and the new strategy is decided. Thus, each user needs to know the new updated strategy of all users, as for the NE before but also their utility functions. Alternately, all users send their new strategy to one of the users or a central observer who computes Φ and announces to all whether to keep the new update or the previous. The computational complexity of this algorithm is much less than that of Algorithm 2 because of the expected value computation in Algorithm 2.
We can also add a termination condition. If the strategy x n stays same for N 1 > 0 consecutive iterations, we stop. The probability that we stop at the global optimum increases with
The Pareto point obtained here may have some fairness issues, i.e., although the point obtained maximizes Φ, some player may get larger α k than others. This can be adjusted by picking Pareto points which are also Nash bargaining solutions [21] . Such solutions are discussed below.
Algorithm 3 Algo-Pareto 1 Initialization: All the FCs k = 1, 2, ..., K will pick an arbitrary strategy denoted by x 0 ∈ X and exchange with each other. 1. Each FC k picks one of the channels randomly and reallocates to one of the users uniformly at random. Then it randomly reallocates its powers to each channel. Let the new overall strategy be denoted by x. Then,
otherwise.
Repeat until converges or the termination criterion is met. V. NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
In addition to not being fair, usually there are multiple that {α ∈ F : α k ≥α k , ∀k ∈ I } is a nonempty bounded set.
Also assume that there exists some α ∈ F such that α k > α k , ∀k. Then there exists a unique α ≥α that maximizes
which is the Nash Bargaining Solution of the problem.
We consider the problem in (10)-(11) for computation of Nash Bargaining solution. A feasible pay off allocation is F = {α = (α 1 , α 2 , ..., α K ) : 0 ≤ α k ≤ 1, ∀k} which is a closed, convex set. Also considerα such that there is a feasible α > α. Then from the above Theorem 1 we have a unique Nash Bargaining solution Φ(F,α). Equation (16) can be rewritten as (by taking logarithm)
In order to avoid a non-positive number within logarithm,we
where c > 0 is appropriately chosen. We use Algorithm 3/3M
to compute the Nash Bargaining Solution via (17) .
α should be carefully chosen. We can takeα = 0. We can also choose it as a NE or according to some QoS requirement.
VI. COEXISTENCE OF VOICE AND DATA USERS
In this section we consider the case where each FC k may have data users and voice users. We extend our algorithms developed above to this scenario and compute a CCE, a Pareto optimal point and a Nash Bargaining solution.
Let D k be the set of data users and V k be the set of voice users. We consider the following modified problem. At each
and
Equation (19) specifies that a largest fraction of the QoS of data users are satisfied and equation (20) specifies that QoS of voice users are fully satisfied. Since voice users require much less rate, the network will often have enough resources to satisfy (19) .
To obtain a CCE for this problem we use the algorithms of Section III only but change the utilities α k of FC k as follows: if at a given power and channel allocation, the rate of any of its voice users is not satisfied, then we make its α k = 0; otherwise compute it as in Section III based on data users only. This will ensure that if an FC has a positive utility, the rate requirements of all its voice users is satisfied.
Next we consider the Pareto points. Using the modified α k given above does not always provide a solution with stochastic local search. It can be made to work if we carefully tailor our stochastic local search to the constraints. Thus, instead, we consider penalty function method corresponding to eq. (12).
Combining equations (19) and (20), as in equation (12) we
and Algorithm 2A to obtain a CCE.
Next we consider LHS of equation (22) as Φ k and obtain a Pareto optimal solution from equation (14) and Algorithm 3 and 3M. Also, Φ k is closed and convex. Hence it has a Nash Bargaining solution. By considering α k = Φ k in equation (17), we obtain a Nash Bargaining Solution. For all voice and data users (whose QoS is satisfied) at their allocated channels we can minimize power using KKT conditions while ensuring that their rate requirements are satisfied.
From equation (12), we formulate equations (18)- (21) as,
Using equation (23) and (14), we obtain Pareto optimal points.
VII. EXAMPLES
In this section we consider a system with 2 FCs each with Subchannel gain matrices; The interference matrices (mw) are
Maximum powers (mw) allocated to the subchannels are,
Rate requirements of the users, in kbps, in the two FC are, We have verified that the rate requirement of all the users cannot be satisfied for this case. Thus, we obtain a fair NE via Algorithm 3 (regret matching) of [29] . There are multiple Convergence to a Pareto optimal point for utilities α k , obtained using Algorithm 3M for (10)- (11) Convergence to a Pareto optimal point obtained using Next we consider an example when the QoS of all the users in both the FCs can be satisfied. We generated the subchannel gain matrices
interference matrices (mw) are It is observed that CCEs obtained via (10) and (13) give the same channel allocation, whereas power allocation is slightly different. This is because for (10) we do power control using the obtained channel allocation.
For the problem (10)-(11) using Algorithm 3, we obtain 
Voice and Data Users:
Next we consider a system with 2 FCs, each with 2 voice users and 1 data user (for FC 1, {2, 3} are voice users and {1} is data user; for FC 2, {1, 3} are voice users and {2} is data user) and 4 subchannels. We generated the subchannel gain matrices G 1 , G 2 , G 1,2 , G 2,1 as before. The interference matrices (in mw) are Rate requirements of the users, in kbps, are, using equation (14) and Algorithm 3 are shown in Fig 13. The subchannel allocation is CA The utilities are α 1 = 0.9318 and α 2 = 0.6883.
Utilities of the Pareto points obtained for (23) using equation (14) and Algorithm 3 are shown in Fig 14. The subchannel allocation is CA Also, α 1 = 0.9601, α 2 = 0.6789. Now the total power used is more than that of the above Pareto point.
Utilities of the Nash Bargaining solution withα = {1.4, 1.4} obtained for LHS of (22) algorithms to obtain coarse correlated equilibria. We have also provided a distributed algorithm to obtain Pareto points and Nash bargaining solutions. For the Pareto points (also for the NB solution) we have also obtained a powerful low complexity heuristic. Finally we have extended these algorithms to a system with voice and data users, when the voice users are guaranteed their rates.
